Fire Science Management

Fire Science Management

Background Information

Before determining whether or not the Nation Fire Protection Association Code 550 (NFPA 550), it is imperative to have a proper understanding of the roles or purposes of the general National Fire Protection Association. This association is one of the most imperative organs in the United States; it creates codes, benchmarks and standards that can be applied by various organizations or local governmental department. The association also provides publication related to model building codes that can be used to guide firefighters to manage hazardous equipment during firefighting process. One of the most commonly applied codes that have been provided by this association is the NFPA 550. This code provides a guiding structure, application and limitations through a Fire Safety Concept Tree that can be used by firefighting stakeholders to assess and analyze fire safety issues or strategies. The specific issue addressed by the National Fire Protection Association involves an examination of the association or relationship between fire safety features as well as their impacts on the achievement of certain fire safety management goals. It provides stakeholders with tools that can be used safely to manage fire safety incidents. Some of the most commonly applied concepts of this code are available in the fourth and the fifth chapters. Chapter four of this code focuses on logic gates, fire safety objectives, Management of Fire Impact and Prevention of Fire Ignition (www.nfpa.org). In the fifth chapter, the code provides general applications of the standards or guidelines provided in the fourth chapter for instance: Guidelines for fire safety management communication, building management, building design, performance-based evaluation, building change control/management as well as research and other applications.

         

Analysis

From an investigation performed by the Tennessee Valley Authority concerning the fire outbreak at Watts Bar Hydro-electric Plant, there are several key issues that emerged. The report provided by TVA indicates that building structure could have been one of the factors that triggered the fire outbreak . This occurred through occurrence of heat that was trapped steel and concrete in the building, leading to elevated temperature. Additionally, five people were stuck in the building due to the location within the building making it difficult for them to find their way through the smoke. The report also indicates that there was poor communication as a result of little radio reception and lack of awareness of fire outbreak among employees. Furthermore, the report indicates that firefighting personnel and other concerned stakeholders were unaware of some parts of the building that were electrically charged. The other factor that contributed to massive loss experienced by the Watts Bar Hydro-electric plant was lack of pre-plans among local response team i.e. most of them did not have the pre-plans for the structure of the building, hence could not access certain parts of the building. In their report, the Tennessee Valley Authority also indicates that the Watts Bar Hydroelectric Plant had failed to comply with Life Safety Codes.

From a personal perspective, I believe that the National Fire Protection Association Code 550 could have prevented and facilitated mitigation of the fire outbreak at Watts Bar Hydroelectric Power Plant. To begin with, chapter four of this provides information regarding how organizations or stakeholders can prevent fire ignition through three different strategies; control of fuel, control of source-fuel interactions and control of heat as well as energy sources. However, in the report provided by the Tennessee Valley Authority, it is indicated that mitigation of the fire outbreak at the plant was unsuccessful considering the fact that there was no proper control of batteries and electrical charges within the building. In addition, the National Fire Protection Association Code 550 provides a guideline indicated in the fourth chapter on how Fire Impact should be managed. This is conducted through management of fire, which is achieved by suppressing fire, controlling fire by appropriate construction and controlling the combustion process. Application of these strategies would have facilitated mitigation of the fire outbreak in the Plant. The TVA risk analysis report indicates that WBH did not take these issues into consideration due to the fact that the building was poorly designed by use of steel and concrete that facilitated the fire outbreak. Additionally, poor building design or construction led to the trapping of five people who could not find their way through the building. On the other hand, the Watts Bar Hydroelectric Plant did not have appropriate fire protection systems that would have facilitated suppression of the fire. As aforementioned, NFPA Code 550, stipulates that management of fire should be done by controlling combustion process; however, this was not practiced in the case of Watts Bar Hydro-electric Plant due to lack of pre-plans of the building design among the fire response team, hence hindering their efforts to participate in the mitigation process.

Consequently, chapter four of the NFPA Code 550 indicates that management of fire impact should be successfully achieved by managing exposure to hazardous conditions such as smoke, heat et cetera. This can be achieved through application of safeguard exposure and limiting the amount of time of exposure to these hazards. Application of this stipulation would have reduced the amount of time exposure to smoke for employees who were trapped in the building. The two major reasons that led to the exposure of the employees to smoke was; poor building structure and a dysfunctional alarm system that was destroyed by the fire. According to Gagnon, 2008, design of proper alarm systems is an imperative strategy that organizations can apply to reduce the amount of time workers and other stakeholders are exposed to hazardous conditions associated with fire outbreak.